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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
SUTER V. STUCKEY: PARTIES TO A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
PROTECTIVE ORDER ENTERED BY CONSENT DO NOT 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN APPEAL. 
By: Lydia Hu 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that parties to a 
domestic violence protective order entered by consent do not have the 
right to an appeal. Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 935 A.2d 731 
(2007). More specifically, the Court held that the Protection from 
Domestic Violence Act does not abrogate the common law rule that a 
judgment entered by consent may not be appealed. Suter, 402 Md. at 
232, 935 A.2d at 744. 
In April 2006, Darryl Stuckey ("Stuckey") was arrested for a 
domestic violence incident in which he attacked his fiancee, Judith 
Suter ("Suter"), in their home. One week later, Stuckey harassed Suter 
at her place of employment, prompting Suter to file a petition for a 
temporary protective order ("TPO") against Stuckey in the District 
Court for Prince George's County. On April 13, 2006, the district 
court issued the TPO and scheduled a hearing for the final protective 
order on April 20, 2006. The court entered a final protective order by 
consent. 
On May 17, 2006, Stuckey noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County. Suter moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing 
that the appeal was time-barred and that Stuckey was estopped from 
appealing a consent judgment. The circuit court granted the motion to 
dismiss and affirmed the final protective order. 
Stuckey subsequently requested an in banc review of the circuit 
court ruling and argued that he was entitled to a de novo hearing in the 
circuit court. The panel ruled that the statutes governing appeals from 
district court to circuit court in domestic violence cases gave Stuckey a 
right to a de novo appeal. The panel found section 12-401(f) of the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("section 12-401 (f)") 
controlling, which provides that appeals from civil judgments when 
the amount in controversy is greater than $5,000 will be heard on the 
district court record. Moreover, section 12-401 (f) provides that all 
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other appeals will be tried de novo. The panel determined that the 
instant case was an example of "every other case" to be tried de novo 
because appeals from domestic violence protective orders are not 
noted in companion exceptions. Thus, the panel reversed the circuit 
court's holding and remanded the case for a trial de novo. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted Suter's petition for writ of certiorari to 
address the question of whether parties to a domestic violence 
protective order entered by consent have the right to an appeal. 
Before addressing the case on the merits, the Court addressed the 
threshold question of whether the case was moot. Suter, 402 Md. at 
219, 935 A.2d at 736. A case is moot "when there is no longer an 
existing controversy when the case comes before the Court or when 
there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could grant." Id. at 
219, 935 A.2d at 736 (quoting Dep't of Human Res. v. Roth, 398 Md. 
137, 143,919 A.2d 1217, 1221 (2007». 
The protective order at issue in the instant case expired on April 18, 
2007. Id. at 219, 935 A.2d at 736. Even if the Court were to find that 
Stuckey was entitled to a trial de novo, no relief was possible and 
therefore the Court held this case was moot. Id. at 219, 935 A.2d at 
736. However, the Court found it appropriate to address the merits of 
the case because it "implicates an important public policy, it is likely 
to recur, and on recurrence it will evade review." Id. at 220,935 A.2d 
at 737. 
Stuckey argued, and the in bane panel below found, that the plain 
language of section 4-507 of the Family Law Article ("section 4-
507"), codified as part of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act 
("the Act"), and section 12-401(d) of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, allow de novo appeals from protective orders 
entered by consent. Suter, 402 Md. at 222,935 A.2d at 737-38. After 
examining the legislative history of both statutes, the Court was not 
similarly persuaded. Id. at 226,935 A.2d at 740. 
When two statutes apply, the Court must first reconcile them, and 
in the event they are contradictory, the Court must apply the more 
specific statute. Id. at 231,935 A.2d at 743 (citing Md. Nat 'I Capital 
Park and Planning v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 183,909 A.2d 694, 700 
(2006». Section 4-507 is the more specific statute involved in the 
instant facts, so the Court examined that provision first and reconciled 
section 12-401 with section 4-507. Suter, 402 Md. at 231,935 A.2d at 
743. 
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The Act provides for a de novo appeal in section 4-507(b )(1), as 
follows: "If a District Court judge grants or denies relief under a 
petition filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person eligible for 
relief, or a petitioner may appeal to the circuit court for the county 
where the District Court is located." Suter, 402 Md. at 216, 935 A.2d 
at 734. Section 4-507(b)(2) further provides that appeals taken 
pursuant to the above section shall be "heard de novo in the circuit 
court." Suter, 402 Md. at 216, 935 A.2d at 734. The Court was not 
persuaded by a plain language interpretation of section 4-507(b)(2) 
and explained it must consider the statutory language as it is found 
within the broader context of the Act to achieve the over-arching 
purpose of protecting victims of domestic violence. Suter, 402 Md. at 
231, 935 A.2d at 743. Allowing appeals from protective orders 
entered by consent would invariably diminish the incentive for 
domestic violence victims to enter into such agreements, thereby 
undermining the purpose of the Act. Suter, 402 Md. at 231, 935 A.2d 
at 743. 
The Court also recognized a secondary legislative goal in reducing 
the costs of implementing protective orders. Id. at 232, 935 A.2d at 
743. The administrative costs of a trial are avoided when protective 
orders are entered by consent. Id. at 232,935 A.2d at 743. Hearing de 
novo appeals from consent protective orders would undoubtedly 
increase administrative costs. !d. at 232,935 A.2d at 743. 
When construing statutory provisions, the Court is bound by the 
rule that the common law will not be repealed by mere implication. 
Id. at 232, 935 A.2d at 734. The applicable Maryland common law 
rule to the instant case is that "the only persons who may appeal a 
judgment are those aggrieved by that judgment." Id. at 232, 935 A.2d 
at 744 (citing Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 248-49, 909 A.2d 
1035, 1041 (2006». The established result of that common law rule is 
that a consent judgment may not be appealed because a consenting 
party cannot be aggrieved. Id. at 232-33, 935 A.2d at 744. The 
legislature did not expressly abrogate or limit the common law rule 
that a party may not appeal from a consent judgment, and the Court 
refused to "read into [section 4-507(b)(1)] as an abrogation of the 
common law rule." Suter, 402 Md. at 233, 935 A.2d at 744. 
The Court further explained that section 12-401 can be construed 
harmoniously with the Act because section 12-401(f) determines the 
mode of appeal but does not grant or constrain the right of appeal. 
Suter, 402 Md. at 234, 935 A.2d at 745. Rather, the grant of a right to 
appeal in domestic violence protective orders is governed by section 4-
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507 of the Act and Maryland common law. Suter, 402 Md. at 234, 
935 A.2d at 745. 
By deciding this case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland helps 
achieve the legislature's goals of protecting victims of domestic 
violence. Suter is particularly important because entering domestic 
violence consent orders at the district court level will now be treated as 
if the parties have waived their right to appeal. The finality of consent 
orders quickly ensures security for victims and provides the option of 
avoiding litigation. 
